Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Political Science Theses

Department of Political Science

5-13-2021

The Political Revolution in Managerial Power: Corporate
Personhood and the American Plutocratic Class
Liam Ammerman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_theses

Recommended Citation
Ammerman, Liam, "The Political Revolution in Managerial Power: Corporate Personhood and the
American Plutocratic Class." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2021.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/22579314

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Political Science at ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Theses by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@gsu.edu.

The Political Revolution in Managerial Power: Corporate Personhood and the American
Plutocratic Class

by

Liam Ammerman

Under the Direction of Andrew Wedeman, PhD

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
in the College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University
2021

ABSTRACT
The extension of political rights to corporations through Supreme Court decisions has
altered the makeup of the plutocratic class in the United States. I argue that classifying campaign
finance as a first amendment right afforded to corporate entities gave political power to corporate
managers and shifted American political ideology in turn. This shift is reflected in government
policies that prioritize the interests of the plutocratic class, resulting in a feedback loop that
amplifies their wealth and power. This analysis will review the Supreme Court decisions that
caused this, the subsequent polices, and how both contribute to the political power of corporate
managers and owners. I will conclude by considering how this influenced the current political
situation in the United States.

INDEX WORDS: Corporate personhood, Managerial capitalism, Neoliberalism,
Neoconservatism

Copyright by
Liam Henry Ammerman
2021

The Political Revolution in Managerial Power: Corporate Personhood and the American
Plutocratic Class

by

Liam Ammerman

Committee Chair: Andrew Wedeman

Committee:

Charles Hankla
Michael Evans

Electronic Version Approved: 4/9/21

Office of Graduate Services
College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University
May 2021

iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... 1
1

SECTION 1: BUCKLEY V. VALEO, FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON V.
BELOTTI, AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ............................................... 6

2

1.1.1

Buckley v. Valeo ....................................................................................................... 6

1.1.2

First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti ................................................................ 8

1.1.3

The 1980 election and Reagan administration ..................................................... 12

SECTION 2: CITIZENS UNITED, THE KOCH BROTHERS, AND THE TEA
PARTY ............................................................................................................................. 16

3

2.1.1

Citizens United ........................................................................................................ 16

2.1.2

The Koch brothers and the Tea Party.................................................................... 22

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 27

REFERENCES............................................................................................................................ 33

1
INTRODUCTION
The wealthy class have always held political power in any democracy, but there has been
a noticeable shift in the behavior of Western democracies in the last four decades, particularly
the United States. The American government has fashioned policies that are exclusively
favorable to not just the wealthier class but specifically to corporate interests. This coupled with
eroding support for the middle and working class has caused more extreme forms of populism to
gain traction. Why are ostensibly democratic systems increasingly beholden to corporate
interests? I argue that the answer lies in the legal evolution of corporate personhood. The
Supreme Court has extended first amendment protections to corporate campaign financing and
has therefore given political power to the managers of corporate capital. This created a sort of
managerial class whose interests often align with that of the owner class and the two cooperate
by using their respective influence, such as mass media or individual contributions. The Supreme
Court cases in question authorized the uses of both corporate money and personal money to
develop networks of political influence, with the owner class utilizing personal assets for
extreme increases in individual contributions to advocacy groups and Super PACs and the
managerial class using corporate revenue for political advertising and lobbying efforts. The
landmark Supreme Court decisions of Buckley v. Valeo and First National Bank of Boston v.
Belotti made it possible for the managers to use corporate money in ways that owners had long
been using personal money for. The “corporate interests” are really the political interests of the
managers who are free to use corporate funds to express the broader interests of the wealthy class
with corporate personhood as an additional tool.
This research builds off Alfred Chandler’s seminal work by considering the
political ramifications of modern enterprise, analyzing how the managerial class acquired and
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exercises political power (Chandler 1977). Chandler’s concept of “managerial capitalism” is the
ideal foundation for understanding the political influence of corporate personhood and why it has
had such a profound effect on American governance (Chandler 1977). Chandler provides a
useful framework for understanding modern economic structure but stops short of addressing
their “impact on existing political and social arrangements” (Chandler 1977). This research is
also a response to Hacker and Pierson’s argument that “policy drift”, or lack of policy reform,
has produced our intensely stratified socioeconomic situation (Hacker and Pierson 2010). Their
argument is correct if we assume the general goal of government policy is to satisfy the majority,
i.e. the middle and working class, who have experienced economic stagnation and government
inaction since 1980. However, the government has taken several actions to implement numerous
policies to satisfy the managerial class, so the current socioeconomic stratification is more a
result of reprioritization than inaction. The development of what Chandler calls managerial
capitalism created this new socioeconomic class between that of the ultra-wealthy owners and
the middle class and it was this managerial class’ push for political power that gave rise to
neoliberalism and neoconservatism. This push was challenged in the courts and set important
precedents that legitimized their influence and set the stage for it to flourish. The corporate
managers’ acquisition of political power thus refocused policy objectives on their interests with
the side effect of producing “policy drift” for the middle and working class (Hacker and Pierson
2010).
This analysis will be divided into two parts. The first section will focus on the two
of the four Supreme Court cases that protect corporate campaign financing and how these
decisions affected the use of political money. As mentioned previously, the cases of Buckley v.
Valeo (1976) and First National Bank of Boston v. Belotti (1978) are the cornerstones for this
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shift. This section will examine the political context of these decisions and their broader
implications. The dissenting opinions of Justice Byron White will receive special focus because
he was mostly correct in his predictions concerning the effects of these decisions and his words
are particularly relevant to contemporary American politics. Then I will analyze the effect these
decisions had on the 1980 election, specifically the increases in private campaign funding and
the effect this had on both the outcome and the future party platforms. This section will also
review how the Reagan administration shifted the political objectives of conservatives to that of
anti-government, anti-labor, and deregulation. Specifically, the many reforms to the tax code
such as the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that sought to
reduce government spending by choking its income, as well as Revenue Ruling 88-76
concerning the IRS’ classification of LLCs (Field 2009). These policies are beneficial
specifically to the managerial class and worked to strengthen their control over capital, which in
turn gave them more resources to strengthen their political power.
The second section will then consider the now infamous Supreme Court case that
extended corporate political power and played an important role in developing the current
political scenario in the United States. The case in question is Citizens United v. FEC (2010), but
to understand the reasoning of this case we must also consider Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce (1990) and McConnell v. FEC (2003). The Austin decision is the focal point of the
debate in Citizens United because it restricted corporate speech in the context of campaign
financing and was overruled by Citizens United. McConnel decision upheld the constitutionality
of Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act , and Citizens United overruled a portion of McConnell v.
FEC concerning restrictions on corporate spending for electioneering communications. Citizens
United ruled that corporate spending on political communications is protected by the first
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amendment, which gave way to a massive surge in political advertising. This section will analyze
the effect this ruling had on corporate political spending by examining corporate spending on
traditional Political Action Committees (PACs) and the Koch brothers personal political
spending on Super PACs. This comparison will represent the different relationship that the
owner class has with political money versus the managerial class and finds that the owners’
individual contributions skyrocketed while the corporate donations to traditional PACs only saw
a negligible increase. This is due to the symbiotic relationship between the two factions of the
wealthy class and corporate managers having more effective political influence through public
relations and mass media, with the owners’ having far more discretionary capital at their disposal
which was now approved for unlimited spending. This interplay combined to boost the political
power of the Tea Party movement and made far right populism a mainstream political ideology,
which reflects the political ideology of large donors such as the Koch brothers.
I will conclude by expanding on these developments to consider the broader
implications of corporate managerial political power and what its current role is in American
politics. This section will examine how the ultra-conservative movement cultivated by the
combined efforts of the plutocratic class produced the Trump Presidency and how that
widespread support has influenced other politicians. I will consider how the Trump
administration’s open embrace of corruption and corporate capital interests has eroded the
legitimacy of public institutions and brought the United States to the brink of civil conflict. Then
I will consider if any solutions could possibly diffuse this in the immediate short-term. Given the
historical record, the outlook is grim.
The broader purpose of this research is to identify the policies that enable the
managerial class to exercise political power and understand how this power is consolidated
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through economic reforms. The American system of governance is highly dependent on financial
institutions and corporate donors because of the way campaign financing has been transformed
by these Supreme Court decisions. Politicians must cater to the managers of corporate capital to
gain political traction because they ultimately hold the keys to electoral victory, ie large donor
contributions and mass media influence. At first it was focused merely on economic gain and
reducing the government’s control on the marketplace, but over time it has taken an a more
ideological bent with alarming historical parallels. I argue that this created the hyper polarized
political discourse in the United States that was seized upon by former President Trump to win
the 2016 election and why there is fierce resistance to the legitimacy of current President Joe
Biden’s electoral3 victory. This shift has also affected the perceived legitimacy of the
Democratic Party, which was happy to partake in the economic benefits of campaign reform but
have become the villains of far right populism and are increasingly viewed as corrupt by their
own base.
The methodology for this research will be a qualitative assessment of primary
documents that utilizes the framework of secondary sources to establish a unique argument. The
primary documents in question are the previously mentioned Supreme Court cases, with specific
attention to the dissent written by Justice Byron White, legislation such as Reagan’s tax policies,
IRS Revenue rulings, and campaign financing reports. The secondary sources will be the works
of Chandler, Hacker, and Pierson, as well as analyses of these developments that provide the
necessary context, including a fascinating look at the development of the Tea Party by Theda
Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson. My unique argument is that the managerial class has altered
the makeup of the plutocratic class, specifically expanding its membership to a point where it can
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be organized on both federal and state levels with cohesive interests that have become more
ideologically extreme over time.
1

SECTION 1: BUCKLEY V. VALEO, FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON V.
BELOTTI, AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
1.1.1

Buckley v. Valeo

The landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo is the launch point of first amendment
protections for campaign financing, which in turn is the basis for corporate managerial political
power. This case was filed in response to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 because,
“in the appellants’ view, limited the use of money for political purposes constitutes a restriction
on communication violative of the First Amendment, since virtually all meaningful political
communications in the modern setting involve the expenditure of money” and “the reporting and
disclosure provisions of the Act unconstitutionally impinge on their right to freedom of
association (Buckley v. Valeo 1976). The plaintiffs, Senator James L. Buckley and Senator
Eugene McCarthy, argued “that contributions and expenditures are at the very core of political
speech”, given how campaigns relied heavily on advertising and organizing public events
(Buckley v. Valeo 1976). While the court recognized the Federal Election Campaign Act was
“aimed in part at equalizing the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes” it found
that the expenditure limits “reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached” (Buckley v. Valeo
1976). The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the means of modern communication “requires
the expenditure of money”, citing costs related to printing, rallies, radio and television ads, and
mass news media (Buckley v. Valeo 1976). The shift to mass media reliance for public discourse
necessitated the view that money is speech because the companies that owned the

7
communications infrastructure demanded payment for its use. The court’s decision legitimized
the arrangement that privately held mass media is the primary forum for political expression
despite the clear implications such an arrangement has regarding the equal access of that
expression. Further, this decision gave the managers of these mass media companies significant
political power because they were not obligated to provide equal access to those with the
resources to pay for such access and they could direct political messaging at their own discretion.
This factor is especially relevant to contemporary politics, where such managers have full time
spokespeople for political ideologies.
The court had different views on contributions. It held that “a limitation on the
amount of money a person may give…does not in any way infringe the contributors freedom to
discuss candidates and issues” and “the overall effect of the Act’s contribution ceilings is merely
to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons”
(Buckley v. Valeo 1976). They recognized that capping the contributions made campaign
financing more democratic and limited the influence any one contributor could have on a
political campaign or prospective politician. However, by making a distinction between
individual contributions and candidates’ personal expenditures on their own campaigns, the court
undercut the democratizing effect of capping contribution amounts. Justice Byron White noted in
his opinion that “limiting the importance of personal wealth…helps to assure that only
individuals with a modicum of support from others will be viable candidates” and that the
restrictions on personal spending would “equalize access to the political arena, encouraging the
less wealthy, unable to bankroll their own campaigns, to run for political office” (Buckley v.
Valeo 1976). This view outlines the relationship that political money has with both access to the
political process and its influence on political platforms. Justice White understood that limiting
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the amount of money anyone, including that candidates themselves, could put into a campaign
served to make the entire process more equal and democratic. Justice White’s opinion also
explicitly recognizes the disproportionate representation enjoyed by the wealthier class given
that they had the resources to finance their own campaigns.
While this case did not directly hand power to corporate managers, it provides the
legal basis for the contemporary political power of money and legitimizes private mass media
companies as the arbiters of public discourse. The salient points made by Justice White regarding
the importance of restricting personal contributions will be especially relevant to analyzing
Citizens United, which opened up unlimited contributions to Super PACs and had an enormous
impact on the overall direction of contemporary American politics. It is also important to
establish Buckley v. Valeo as the background for analyzing the next Supreme Court decision of
interest, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978), especially since it is explicitly cited in
the appeal (First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 1978).
1.1.2

First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti

This next case is a much clearer extension of constitutional protections to corporations
that gave corporate managers a great deal of political power. The Court held that states could not
create laws that “abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect” (Bellotti
1978). The context here concerns the Massachusetts statute, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 55, § 8,
that limited corporate speech to “issues that materially affect its business, property, or assets”,
which was challenged by the First National Bank of Boston when its managers “wanted to spend
money to publicize their views on a proposes constitutional amendment” concerning a graduated
individual income tax (First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 1978). The Massachusetts
Supreme Court cited Buckley v. Valeo by “acknowledging that § 8 operate[s] in an area of the
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most fundamental First Amendment activities", and “viewed the principal question as ‘whether
business corporations, such as [appellants], have First Amendment rights coextensive with those
of natural persons or associations of natural persons", ie whether or not corporations could have
first amendment rights (First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 1978). The Supreme Court saw
this as the wrong question, and as previously noted instead framed the issue as whether a state
could create statutes that abridge “expression” (First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 1978).
It is interesting to note the distinction between the form of expression being protected vs. a
corporation’s possession of constitutional rights, with political expenditures being a form of
protected speech consistent with the Buckley v. Valeo decision. The basis for this is the court’s
view of commercial speech as necessary for the “free flow of information” and that the first
amendment “prohibit government from limiting the stock of information” (First National Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti 1978). Whether the source of the information is a corporation or an
individual is irrelevant because the court views all “speech that otherwise would be within the
protection of the First Amendment” cannot lose said protection on that basis (First National Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti 1978). A later iteration of the Court would rule the other way in Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990), indicating that this more extreme impartiality is
dependent on the ideological leanings of the Court rather than a consistent practice of the
institution itself. Ideology has increasingly become the focal point of our political discourse, and
the Court has proven to be equally susceptible to ideological splits.
Taken together, these decisions gave corporate managers the right to utilize
corporate funds for political expenditures beyond the immediate concerns of the corporation
itself. In his dissent, Justice White pointed out that “The Court invalidates the Massachusetts
statute and holds that the First Amendment guarantees corporate managers the right to use not
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only their personal funds, but also those of the corporation, to circulate fact and
opinion…necessarily representing their own personal of collective views about political and
social questions” First National Bank of Boston v. (Belotti 1978, Justice White dissenting).
Additionally, Justice White viewed this decision as a restriction of the State of Massachusetts’
First Amendment rights, specifically the states regulatory power to protect the shareholders from
having their money used to express views they disagree with (First National Bank of Boston v.
Belotti 1978, Justice White dissenting). Justice White correctly viewed corporate political
expenditures as the corporate managers’ political expression independent of the shareholders and
that this decision allowed them to use shareholder investments to further their political
objectives. The use of these funds significantly increases the scope of political expression
available to corporate managers and grants them disproportional representation in public
discourse. Justice White noted “that the special status of corporations has placed them in a
position to control vast amounts of economic power which may, if not regulated, dominate not
only the economy but also the very heart of our democracy, the electoral process” (First National
Bank of Boston v. Belotti 1978, Justice White dissenting). White argued that the special status
afforded to corporate entities by states that allows them to be more profitable and economically
viable should not be leveraged for political advantage and that if the state did not regulate such
expenditures then it was favoring corporate political objectives by default (First National Bank
of Boston v. Belotti 1978, Justice White dissenting). Additionally, White argued that allowing
corporate managers to use corporate money for political purposes that were against the views of
the shareholders not only infringes shareholders’ First Amendment rights but is also inconsistent
with how the court had ruled previously concerning political money. Justice White goes on to
cite Machinists v. Street (1961), where a railway “union shop authorized by the Railway Labor
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Act, had used the union treasury to which all employees were compelled to contribute ‘to finance
campaigns of candidates for federal and state offices whom [the petitioners] opposed, and to
promote the propagation of political and economic doctrines, concepts, and ideologies with
which [they] disagree” and the Court “construed the [Railway Labor] Act to prohibit the use of
compulsory union dues for political purposes” (Machinists v. Street 1961, First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti 1978, Justice White dissenting). Justice White also cites Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education, another case where the Court ruled that union dues could not be used for
political purposes (First National Bank of Boston v. Belotti 1978, Justice White dissenting). By
ruling against union use of political money and for corporate use of political money, the Court is
making a distinction between different types of political money where an organization’s use of
money that was amassed for other purposes violates contributors’ First Amendment rights if the
money is union dues but is a protected form of expression if the money is liquid corporate
revenue. This distinction essentially establishes a sort of corporate personhood where the
corporation’s revenue is given the same political use protections as personal funds possessed by
individuals. Absent, however, is the notion that the personal funds of the owners is also a
byproduct of the corporation’s special status, which is understandable given that at the time there
were restrictions on individual contributions and the loopholes around them were limited.
Justice White’s dissention also brings up the possibility for this money to become
a corrupting influence and create political debts. He criticizes the Court’s relative indifference to
corruption, citing Buckley v. Valeo where, “the Court has previously held in Buckley v. Valeo
that the interest in preventing corruption is insufficient to justify restrictions upon individual
expenditures relative to candidates for political office” and notes that “corporate contributions to
and expenditures on behalf of political candidates may be no more limited than those of
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individuals. Individual contributions under federal law are limited but not entirely forbidden, and
under Buckley v. Valeo expenditures may not be constitutionally limited at all” (First National
Bank of Boston v. Belotti 1978, Justice White dissenting). He goes on to say that the
Massachusetts statute was justified in limiting corporate speech because it protects the overall
“system of freedom of expression” and the statute sought to prevent corporate dominance in the
electoral process First National Bank of Boston v. Belotti 1978, Justice White dissenting).
Justice White’s dissent is a prophetic criticism that clearly understands the
breadth of implications for this ruling’s effect on political money. He outlines how corporate
managers were being handed an enormous amount of political power by being able to dominate
campaign financing and bring about politicians indebted them. The Court’s decision that States
could not restrict campaign financing under the First Amendment should not have been
considered in a vacuum without regard to the economic advantages afforded to corporations and
the distorting effect those advantages have on the way political money is used. The fallout of this
decision is far reaching and has affected the electoral process in precisely the ways Justice White
said that it would, starting with the 1980 election.
1.1.3

The 1980 election and Reagan administration

The 1980 election saw a shift in campaign financing that was a direct response to the
Buckley v. Valeo decision to allow for unlimited expenditures by independent committees
(Briffault 1984). The Court neglected the Federal Election Campaign Act provision that
restricted the expenditures of independent committees in the Buckley decision since the previous
arrangement of unlimited contributions negated the need for independent committees (Briffault
1984). The response was for independent committees to become vehicles of general support
instead of purely issue focused, which led to an enormous increase in private spending for the
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1980 election, specifically “the additional $10.6 million spent by private committees to
disseminate pro-Reagan communications enhanced Reagan’s spending by one-third over the
public grant while Carter was the beneficiary of less than $30,000 in independent expenditures
(Briffault 1980). This is clear evidence of the issues Justice White raised in his dissent, where the
vast resources of corporate wealth could be organized to swamp election cycles with private
money that far outweighed the allotment for public funding. While private money has always
had a big influence on politics, the policy developments made through the Federal Election
Campaign Act and the subsequent Buckley v. Valeo decision created an electoral system that
necessitated organization among contributors rather than between contributors and the candidates
themselves (Briffault 1984). This means that people with access to and influence within
corporate networks would already have the necessary logistical capabilities and resources to
independently coordinate support for any candidate, party, or policy they supported through
these committees and the Bellotti decision allowed them to use corporate revenue to fund said
committees. This gave corporate managers a legitimate political position to work alongside the
owners because their interests aligned as a socioeconomic class and together they have far more
funds at their disposal. Another side effect of this was the rise of Political Action Committees
(PACs), which drew significant funding from business contributors and were responsible for
large portions of all campaign financing in the 1980 election (Briffault 1984). While the
traditional PACs of this era were nowhere near as well-funded or influential as the now infamous
Super PACs would be, they were an important early conduit for corporate political expression
that allowed them to refine their public relations practices and develop more persuasive
messaging.
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The result of this shift in the way political money is amassed and spent has “led to
a politics in which fund-raising is a continuous activity”, mirroring the way corporations are
managed and creating a symbiotic relationship between corporate managers and politicians
(Briffault 1984, Drew 1983). This in turn creates a “structural skewing of the congressional
agenda” where campaign financing begets policy decisions beholden to the financers and
“converts the political process into a mechanism for reinforcing inequalities in society” (Briffault
1984, Drew 1983). We can therefore view subsequent economic policies as direct consequences
of the empowerment of corporate managers by way of campaign finance reform. This is
substantiated by the clear shift in socioeconomic priorities under the Reagan administration,
specifically the tax reforms, IRS rulings, deregulation initiatives, and attacks on organized labor.
The success of this legislation was predicated on a united effort between the executive and
legislative and the Republican Party’s ability to pass these policies was won due to these changes
in campaign financing. The effects of said legislation were a net benefit to corporate managers at
the expense of stable government revenue, which produced a much larger deficit since the
reduced tax revenues did not force spending cuts (Samuelson 1987). The Economic Tax
Recovery Act of 1981 marks the beginning of the policy shift to favor the managerial class and
was the prize for their extensive investments in the 1980 election. Despite the deficit created by
the Reagan administration’s policies, tax cuts became a cornerstone of the Republican party
platform as they are a consistently popular policy (Prasad 2012). However, the tax cuts on their
own were not enough to sway the general public, as evidenced by the weaker than expected
gains for the Republicans in the 1978 midterm election (Prasad 2012). It wasn’t until after
corporate funds were unleashed by the Supreme Court that the Republicans were able to make
the gains they had been strategizing for. The managerial class’ access to and control of media
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networks and pooled political money popularized these ideas on a scale that individual
politicians were unable to accomplish. President Reagan himself has transformed into somewhat
of a mythical figure in conservative politics, with his appeals to unite religious groups with
small-government business people becoming foundational to the ideology of neoconservatism.
Deregulation has become another cornerstone of conservative political platforms
that has had a net benefit to corporate managers at the expense of the broader public. The Reagan
administration made major changes such as the deregulation of the broadcasting industry, the
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act, the opening of federal lands to the oil industry,
and the defunding of the EPA (Leuchtenberg 2015). This deregulation should be considered in
tandem with Reagan’s labor policies, such as the breaking of the Professional Air Traffic
Controllers Organization (PATCO) strike, his appointments to the National Labor Relations
Board, and the downstream effects these decisions had on organized labor (Rossinow 2015).
Organized labor had long been a threat to plutocratic power and for much of the early twentieth
century it seemed that the political revolution would come through labor unions. The wealthy
class’ fears over labor movements escalated steadily over the course of the Cold War and fueled
the Reagan administration’s anti-labor policies. The empowerment of the corporate managers
and their increased influence over the Republican Party crippled the political power of unions,
which has had lasting consequences for the middle class. These policy choices went a long way
in reducing the type of oversight that the ownership class had historically fought against, and it
took the political power of the managerial class to succeed.
Another key policy victory for corporate managers was Revenue Ruling 88-76,
which classified limited liability corporations (LLCs) as partnerships was based on them lacking
corporate characteristics iii (continuity of life) and vi (free transferability of interests) as
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specified by the Kintner regulations, legally establishing the entity’s rights as separate from its
managers and members (Field 2009). LLCs were conceived as a method of subverting specific
tax regulations and following the IRS decision they were used to manipulate the arbitrary legal
differences between partnerships and corporations to achieve those ends (Field 2009). The
primary consequence of this is that it blurred the legal distinction between individuals and
corporations, further allowing corporate managers to accrue greater wealth at minimal risk.
Overall, these landmark court decisions paved the way for a more robust
plutocratic class that combined corporate managers with owners to assert influence over
elections and subsequently the broader direction of political ideology. However, the full weight
of these decisions would not be realized until decades later.
2

SECTION 2: CITIZENS UNITED, THE KOCH BROTHERS, AND THE TEA
PARTY
2.1.1

Citizens United

The case of Citizens United v. the Federal Election Commission (2010) adheres to the
idea that “political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it by design or
inadvertence” (Citizens United v. FEC 2010). The ruling cites both Buckley v. Valeo and First
National Bank of Boston v. Belotti, specifically that the former “invalidated the expenditure
ban…because it failed to serve any substantial government interest in stemming the reality or
appearance of corruption” and that the latter “recognized that the First Amendment applies to
corporations…and extended this protection to the context of political speech” (Citizens United v.
FEC 2010). This would seem to confirm the sort of “feedback loop” that has occurred where
corporate personhood sets precedents that enhance the political power of corporate managers and
are subsequently cited in future rulings to do so again when corporate managers come up with
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new strategies to challenge corporate political regulations. However, the ideological makeup of
the Court itself changes over time, which created a back and forth concerning the political speech
rights of corporations. The ruling cites Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990), which
held that “political speech may be banned based on the speaker’s corporate identity” as the basis
for the McConnell v. FEC (2003) ruling which upheld the limits imposed on electioneering
communications imposed by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (Citizens United v.
FEC 2010). The Austin ruling echoes the dissenting opinion of Justice White in “recognizing a
new governmental interest in preventing ‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of [corporate] wealth…that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for
the corporation’s political ideas” (Citizens United v. FEC 2010, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce 1990). Citizens United explicitly overturns the Austin ruling, where “a pre-Austin
line forbidding speech restrictions based on the speaker’s corporate identity and a post-Austin
line permitting them. Neither Austin’s anti-distortion rationale nor the Government’s other
justifications support § 441b's restrictions” and cites Bellotti as precedent, where “political
speech is indispensable to decision-making in a democracy and this is no less true because
speech comes from a corporation” (Citizens United v. FEC 2010, First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti 1978). The Court is again taking the stance that advantages afforded to the wealthy or
corporations are not sufficient justification for restricting their speech, saying “it is irrelevant for
First Amendment purposes that corporate funds may have little or no correlation to the publics
support for the corporation’s political ideas” (Citizens United v. FEC 2010, Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce 1990). The Court goes on to say that the anti-distortion rationale could
also be used to restrict the political speech of media corporations and such a policy would be
wholly unconstitutional (Citizens United v. FEC 2010). This is a literal interpretation of the First
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Amendment that is willfully detached from the implications of unrestricted corporate political
speech. Both the Buckley and Bellotti rulings are again cited where the Court holds that
independent expenditures do not affect corruption and that having influence over elected officials
does not corrupt said officials (Citizens United v. FEC 2010). These conclusions are tacit
approval of corporate influence over politicians that extends the political influence of corporate
managers far beyond the protections for political spending afforded to them by the Buckley and
Bellotti cases. That this decision fell along ideological lines, with conservative leaning justice
holding a majority, signals the broader aim of the decision and who will benefit from it, ie the
neoconservative business faction. Of note is the Court’s wording of “no sufficient governmental
interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations”,
distinguishing the interests of the public from that of the government ostensibly representing said
public (Citizens United v. FEC 2010). Such an understanding of the government as a separate
entity acting in its self-interest is arguably consistent with the neoconservative perspective,
especially considering their concern over the national deficit and cutting social programs to
address it, though the American way of government is rooted in this concept and the Constitution
is written with the assumption that the government is adversarial to the public. The Court also
consistently uses this language in other decisions, so Citizens United does not set a precedent for
this.
Overall, the decision outlines the importance of the precedents set by the Buckley
and Bellotti Court, since both cases were cited as the primary reasoning for overturning the
Austin decision. It also reaffirms the Court’s custom of considering the letter of the law in a
vacuum, where “the rule that political speech cannot be limited based on a speaker’s wealth is a
necessary consequence of the premise that the First Amendment generally prohibits the
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suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s identity” (Citizens United v. FEC 2010).
This is a conservative understanding of the Supreme Court’s responsibility, that the Court should
only determine the literal constitutionality of a law without regard to the broader implications.
This is despite the Court’s primary responsibility of acting as a check on the other branches, not
merely arbiters of the constitution. Chief Justice Roberts concurring opinion notes that such
prohibitions would subvert public discourse because corporations own all of the major
newspapers and broadcasting systems, which again echoes the Buckley and Bellotti Court’s
justification for unlimited expenditures (Citizens United v. FEC 2010, Justice Roberts
concurring). Justice Stevens dissent drives at the problem with this reasoning, “Even more
misguided is the notion that the Court must rewrite the law relating to campaign expenditures by
for-profit corporations and unions to decide this case” and “The conceit that corporations must
be treated identically to natural persons in the political sphere is not only inaccurate but also
inadequate to justify the Court’s disposition of this case” (Citizens United v. FEC 2010, Justice
Stevens dissenting). Justice Stevens points out that corporations cannot run for office or vote and
because they can be controlled by non-citizens their interests are not necessarily aligned with the
public (Citizens United v. FEC 2010, Justice Stevens dissenting). These points about corporate
personhood and international corporate managers is perhaps the most salient of Stevens’
dissenting opinion. Since a corporation itself is not a person, constitutional protections afforded
to them are thereby extended to corporate managers that control them, including non-citizens.
Not only does this give credence to the anti-distortion rationale of the Austin decision, it is also a
glaring election security flaw, which is especially concerning in the wake of the 2016 election
and the accusations of foreign interference. Justice Stevens further derides the decision by citing
the long history of limitations on corporate campaign spending, including the Tilman Act of
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1907, FEC v. National Right to Work Comm. (1982), FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.
(2007), McConnell v. FEC (2003), FEC v. Beaumont (2003), among others (Citizens United v.
FEC 2010, Justice Stevens dissenting). This point makes it clear that Citizens United, Buckley,
and Bellotti are unusual in the history of the Court and the former’s reliance on the latter two as
precedent is willfully ignoring the more robust precedents that would negate them. Justice
Stevens takes care to warn that “The Court’s ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of
elected institutions across the Nation” as well as “do damage to this institution [The Court]”
(Citizens United v. FEC 2010, Justice Stevens dissenting). Clearly Justice Stevens and those that
joined his dissent understood the broader implications of this decision, which emphasizes how
this was a turning point that has led us to the current situation. He even goes as far as accusing
his colleagues of seizing on this case as an “opportunity to change the law”, arguing that the
original scope of the case did not merit such a decision and that the case was changed to suit the
other Justices desires (Citizens United v. FEC 2010, Justice Stevens dissenting). The dissent
breaks down the inconsistencies in the case law to back up this claim and makes a convincing
argument that the conservative Justices were ethically negligent, pointing out that the Austin or
McConnell decisions were even more justifiable precedents than Buckley v. Valeo and that “the
only thing preventing the majority from affirming the District Court, or adopting a narrower
ground that would retain Austin, is its disdain for Austin” (Citizens United v. FEC 2010, Justice
Stevens dissenting). According to Justice Stevens, the authority held by state legislatures to
regulate corporate electioneering was confirmed by the Austin decision, that Congress used the
Austin decision as the foundation for the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), and that
this decision “shows great disrespect for a coequal branch” and that “the only relevant thing that
has changed since Austin and McConnell is the composition of this Court” (Citizens United v.
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FEC 2010, Justice Stevens dissenting). He rejects the absolutist interpretation of the First
Amendment given the various exceptions the government has implemented with no challenge
from the Court.
Justice Stevens dissent is illuminating and provides an interesting case study of
the Court’s ideological split. The more conservative Justices sought to overturn a very specific
decision that had already been an accepted part of the law for nearly two decades by the time of
review and their rhetoric about corporate political speech being outright banned by it was
duplicitous when placed in context with the history of political speech regulation. Here we see a
clear push for political power from neoconservative Justices who were appointed by
neoconservative politicians who are representatives of corporate managerial power. From this
perspective the damage to the Court that Justice Stevens feared had already been done and this
decision was just a more severe symptom of the institutional corruption that had already taken
root in the federal government. The influence of corporate money in politics had been steadily
increasing since the Buckley decision, and as legislative seats became reliable constants while
presidential platforms veered further right, the justices they appointed represented the same far
right ideology that valued factional loyalty and embraced an anti-government, pro-business
mindset. These latter cases sought to simplify the process and allow corporate managers and
owners to put more money in one place, making effective coordination much easier to carry out.
The McConnell case was the previous push to consolidate corporate influence over elections and
Senator McConnell has become infamous for his work in the years following. The changes
following the Buckley and Bellotti decisions revealed an effective tool for gaining greater power
from a symbiotic relationship between corporate managers and political parties. The Austin
decision was the primary obstacle to even greater power, and from Justice Stevens account it
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appears that Citizens United was a more a concerted effort to remove that obstacle than a debate
over the First Amendment. Citizens United then was the last step in fully opening political
fundraising to corporate donors, built off the foundation of Buckley and Bellotti. It protected an
already corrupt system of campaign financing and made it easier to launder money through the
newly created Super PACs. It was also the warning shot of the hard ideological turn that
mainstream politics was about to take.
2.1.2

The Koch brothers and the Tea Party

The immediate impact of this decision was not the use of corporate funds but a dramatic
increase in independent expenditures on Super PACs (Hansen, Rocca, and Ortiz 2015). In their
2015 analysis, Wendy Hansen et al note that while corporate political expenditures, it was
statistically insignificant, especially compared to the 594% increase in individual expenditures
(Hansen et al 2015). This would suggest that the ownership class has mostly taken advantage of
the new spending tools afforded to them by Citizens United. That same study notes that the Koch
brothers’ own Super PAC, Americans for Prosperity, spent $33,542,058 while Koch Industries
only spent $1,100 through its treasury (Hansen et al 2015). The Koch brothers offer an
interesting case study of political spending since they used much of their personal wealth to build
a network of conservative advocacy while also managing their own corporation, serving as a
nexus of ownership and managerial class benefits. We must here consider that the corporate
managers and the corporate owners benefit collectively as a plutocratic class and may maneuver
independently if it is more efficient and beneficial to do so. The Hansen et al study points out
that corporations have specific public relations needs that may be best served by avoiding Super
PAC donations with treasury funds, while the personal funds of the owners, such as the Koch
brothers, are not bound by traditional arrangements and can therefore be spent with less caution
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(Hansen et al 2015). Distinguishing between the corporate treasury funds and the personal wealth
of the company owners seems like a hollow difference, though, given that the owners’ wealth is
derived from the company’s revenue and their socioeconomic interests are focused around
ensuring their company’s success.
The takeaway here is that the corporate managers have gained membership in the
plutocratic class and their interests now parallel that of the owners. The Buckley and Bellotti
decisions were the primary drivers of corporate managers gaining political relevance, and it was
the political actions of corporate managers that spurred the Citizens United case. As the
managerial class gained political influence, it also increased the political power of the ownership
class, thus binding the two together into a political faction with shared goals and ideologies.
While it is possible that the two might have organized into such a faction in the absence of the
Court’s campaign finance reforms, the effect of the Court’s decision to allow money to translate
into political influence cannot be ignored. These decisions transformed the way elections are
conducted and who dictates the important issues, and the people with the most capital have
benefitted from cooperating. It also cannot be overstated how important ideology has been to this
process and it clearly originated within said companies’ internal business culture that is enforced
by the managers given that they control personnel decisions. Giving greater political power to
these groups brought this culture into government institutions, as evidenced by the corporate
positions held by politicians both before and after serving office and the manner in which
political personnel decisions are made.
The other effect of these decisions has been the rapid polarization of American
political discourse. The creation of Super PACs and the unlimited political spending afforded to
them has produced a well-funded and highly organized system of conservative advocacy groups
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and think tanks that have worked to disseminate their shared ideology to the broader public, such
as the previously mentioned Koch brothers’ Super PAC Americans for Prosperity, as well as
America First Action, Preserve America PAC, and American Crossroads. Combined, these
groups spend hundreds of millions of dollars on political advertising to make their views as
mainstream as possible and have seen resounding success. Their efforts have directly contributed
to the hyper polarized partisan politics of recent years that has focused on cultural identity. The
political results of this were first the Tea Party or Freedom Caucus, which was an ultraconservative group of Republicans in the House of Representative during the Obama
administration and was arguably the flashpoint of contemporary conservative populism in
American politics. This movement legitimized the political ideology of the Koch brothers and
successfully shifted mainstream political discourse much further to the right. Their political
objectives echoed the Reagan administration, “to reduce taxes, slash public spending, curb public
sector unions, and clear away regulations on businesses” while adding the decidedly more
ideological goals of “policing immigrants, safeguarding Second Amendment gun rights, and
promoting pro-life and traditional family values” (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). While the
broader Tea Party movement had a degree of grassroots organization that had started taking off
in 2009, they would not have gained as much traction or won elections without funding from
Americans for Prosperity, which was only able to do so because of the Citizens United decision
in early 2010. The plutocratic class saw the nascent Tea Party movement as an opportunity to
take control of the Republican Party platform and mobilized their respective assets and influence
to support it (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). The ownership class contributed the massive
electoral donations while the corporate managers began recruiting Tea Party spokespeople for
the media to signal boost their “ultra-free market conservatism” (Skocpol and Williamson 2012).
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Corporate media had long been the arbiter of public discourse, as previously noted when it was
used to justify the unlimited expenditures portion of the Buckley decision, and so as the
corporate managers of media companies either became believers in the Tea Party platform or
chased the incoming revenue from Super PACs and advocacy groups. The combined influence of
billionaire owners such as the Koch brothers and the corporate managers control of mass media
catapulted the Tea Party into national relevance and legitimate political power. Citizens United
worked to solidify this symbiotic relationship by providing an effective vehicle for unlimited
individual donations to be used for coordinating national level political strategies that leveraged
mass media influence to win elections. The grassroots origins of the Tea Party lent them an air of
populist legitimacy despite their deep connections to established large donors in Washington and
thus the corporate managers’ and owners’ political goals gained widespread support (Skocpol
and Williamson 2012). This movement would eventually coalesce around Donald Trump
because he managed to fuse corporate interests with the populist rhetoric that the more extreme
Tea Party members were calling for.
The broader effect this has had in the decade since has been to cement the
Republican Party platform as an uncompromising pro-corporate party that can rely on every vote
sticking to the party line because of the sophisticated network of conservative advocacy
developed by the plutocratic donors. The cultural and ideological slant of their advocacy tactics
has allowed them to consolidate influence over rural politics, many state legislatures, and the
federal branches. This influence is also not unique to the Republican Party, as the Democrats are
experiencing an identity crisis split between the small progressive faction of the party and the
moderate centrists who receive campaign funding from the large corporate donors. The antigovernment rhetoric of the Tea Party has delegitimized the Democratic Party among the
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conservative faithful while the Democrats’ willingness to accept the same corporate funds as
their rivals delegitimizes them to the progressive liberal portion of their own party. Senator
Bernie Sanders famously refused to accept large donations and garnered a great deal of
progressive populist support with young voters, but was unable to cultivate enough broader
support to win primaries because of the consolidated right wing influence outside of the cities
and the corporate mass media framing him as a radical socialist. It is impossible to guess how a
Sanders candidacy would’ve performed, given the enormous percentage of non-voters in the last
two Presidential elections while the more moderate swing voters may have voted against him.
That he is considered unelectable despite his grassroots support is arguably more indicative of
the ideology of media companies and the amount of PAC money they receive than any actual
measure of his public support. However, the results of the 2020 election would suggest that the
climate of American politics is far more right-wing than anyone would’ve guessed during the
Obama administration. Again, I argue that this is because of the relentless influence of corporatebacked messaging that has invested vast amounts of capital into a constant campaign to push
American politics towards their ideology and subsequent benefit. The downstream result is an
electorate that favors right-wing politicians and vote accordingly, compounding the institutional
problems previously mentioned. After a decade of this, public discourse has reached near feverpitch, where calls for progressive legislation are met with outright hostility by both the
Republican Party and the public. Most alarmingly is their enthusiasm in organizing a cult of
personality around former President Donald Trump, whose explicitly nationalist and
authoritarian rhetoric is the clearest warning yet that this movement is not satisfied with
unchecked influence or business-friendly policy.
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CONCLUSION

The expansion of corporate first amendment rights by way of landmark Supreme Court
decisions gave corporate managers the necessary tools to assert significant political influence and
consolidate political power over the last forty years. The Supreme Court dismissed the concerns
for potential corruption and disproportionate representation that inevitably arose from these
precedents and instead only considered the constitutionality of the government’s attempts to
restrict corporate campaign financing. The Court even went as far as reversing previous rulings
that had held the government’s ability to restrict corporate speech. The effect this has had on
mainstream American politics is to shift the Overton window to the extreme right. Corporate
political advertising has become a self-sustaining industry that fuses propaganda with marketing
to ensure popular support for candidates who will provide the managerial class their preferred
policies. The obvious culprits are the Republican Party, but this is a bipartisan problem since the
Democratic Party’s core leadership follows mostly right-wing, pro-corporate economic policies
as well because they receive most of their campaign financing from the very same corporate
managers as their Republican counterparts. This has sowed intense public distrust in the
government to such a degree that populism has gained traction among millions. The factional
tensions that have long-plagued American political discourse have been amplified by this and
begun to destabilize broader society, culminating in the Capitol riot on January 6, 2021.
The corporate managers have managed to leverage their position as economic
planners and capitalize on deregulated markets to expand the wealth available to them far beyond
what the Buckley-era Court could have conceived. Now even minor Congressional elections in
small districts become multi-million dollar affairs with enormous advertising budgets. This
makes it nearly impossible for a candidate to compete without corporate support and effectively
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neutralizes the so-called “marketplace of ideas”. While the rise of the internet and social media
have facilitated certain populist ideas gaining more mainstream traction, the political status quo
has resisted much of the ideas that challenge corporate managers’ political power. Despite
consistently raising considerable funds from small donors, Senator Bernie Sanders has failed in
his bids for the Democratic primary, with the DNC instead favoring more corporate-friendly
right-wing candidates like Hillary Clinton and President Joe Biden. Former President Trump
arguably was only ousted because his administration had become an economic liability in the
wake of his mismanagement of the pandemic response, though he still enjoys widespread support
and several large companies have actually seen revenue spikes because of the pandemic (Arora
2020).
The calls for money to be taken out of politics have gotten louder considering the
blatant corruption of the Trump administration, but this is hollow rhetoric given the Court’s
comprehensive decision that corporate political money cannot be restricted. The reality is that
corporate managers are firmly entrenched members of the plutocratic class with vast resources at
their disposal and extensive influence over the government that all but guarantees their money
will not be refused. The mass media conglomerates the managerial class operates have even
cultivated a populist movement to support their unabridged political power, framing it as a
greater freedom only afforded to Americans as a reward for success. This has caused the
Republican Party to metastasize into an extreme pro-corporate neo-fascist party that prioritizes
extending the plutocratic class’ economic dominance over the marketplace and restricting any
attempts to mitigate it. These developments would not have been possible without the political
relevance of the managerial class that coincided with the technological breakthroughs in mass
media and the transformation of the United States into an information economy. This change has
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produced a massive increase in the scale of corporate employment and the number of middle
managers necessary for operations. Their political empowerment gives plutocratic policies the
veneer of democratic support since there are enough of them to give the illusion that their beliefs
are widespread, especially with how social media monopolization bottle necks the distillation of
information and the companies that own the platforms favor right-wing ideas. The current state
of social media in the United States is also a significant national security risk, given that such
platforms are only internally regulated, prioritize revenue over the public good, and collect
extensive amounts of data on all citizens that is then sold to the highest bidder. These platforms
also play host to a number of extremist domestic terror groups who use the platforms for
recruitment and to normalize their views to the general public.
By allowing corporate managers to use corporate revenue gains and media
infrastructure for political activity, they will be incentivized to pursue profit maximization for the
purpose of power instead of purely wealth. It follows that if they profit from anything, whether it
be extremist recruitment, polarization, data collection, etc., they are automatically incentivized to
continue such practices since it affords the resources to accrue greater power. The knock-on
effect is that some of the managers themselves will be radicalized by these practices and then use
the corporate capital available to them to support extremist factions and finance politicians who
use extremist rhetoric. This then shifts the priority from profit maximization for its own sake to
ideology, as we are seeing with the rise of neo-fascist populism in the United States as well as
Brazil, Poland, Greece, Russia, and the United Kingdom.
We must then evaluate the consequences of corporate managerial political power
in the current context. While the corporate managers have integrated into the plutocratic class
and consolidated political power, they are facing an ideological schism. A significant portion of
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the managerial class has become radicalized by “Trumpism” and are throwing their full support
behind candidates that echo former President Trump, while the remaining more moderate
corporate managers favor status quo Democrats and Republicans whose policies are similar. This
has produced a hyper polarized public discourse enabled by the advanced media apparatus
available to either faction, developing into a precursor to possible civil conflict. This is a direct
result of the corrupting influence of corporate capital, which has eroded the effectiveness of
public institutions’ ability to serve the broader population and sown deep distrust of the political
establishment. It has taken a system designed to prioritize stability and compromise and turned it
into a hyper partisan gridlock incapable of addressing even simple grievances. This is a crisis
that threatens to unravel the republic and plunge the world right back into the revolutionary
politics of the early 20th century. The Court’s decision to hold that political money is protected
speech has resulted in a new aristocracy that is reinventing the very practices that inspired
extreme populism to develop and led to the most vicious conflicts in history. We can distill this
down to a class divide between the plutocrats and the rest, and further into an ideological divide
over how best to solve the problem between the extreme left and the extreme right. That is to
say, whether the ill-gotten gains of the aristocrats should be redistributed to the public through
socialism or that they should be unilaterally managed by a strongman. Thus, we find the pattern
but are no closer to finding the solution.
A short-term solution would be to reinstate the FCC Fairness Doctrine, which required
broadcast license holders to present controversial issues and events in an honest and equitable
way and was eliminated in 1987. Further steps to disentangle public discourse from privately
controlled media infrastructure would be necessary, especially given that much of this
information permeates across the internet rather than television. While the effect of social media
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is an important topic, television news still holds an air of legitimacy in many circles. I have
emphasized the importance of media conglomerates in constructing our current scenario, so it
follows that addressing their influence over public perception would be an important first step. It
is also a decision that could be implemented with relatively few political obstacles, though it
would require a president willing to appoint people to the FCC who are receptive to this
prescription. At least it would be a simpler objective than trying to pass anything through
Congress.
The larger issue at hand is the already hyper polarized atmosphere dominating public
discourse. There is no short-term solution for the current situation because it is the result of longterm decision-making and policy. The federal system is facing a crisis of legitimacy and the only
way to mitigate it is to properly address grievances at the scale afforded to its institutional
infrastructure. This is most likely to be done through the executive branch, given that it can be
controlled by one party, but this strategy is not reliable in the long-term since the administration
turns over so frequently. For long-term stability we must turn to Congressional party politics,
which is far more complex. The progressive wing of the Democratic Party has managed to
generate a lot of grassroots public support that could serve as a launchpad for the party to expand
its reach into underserved communities outside of city centers. These smaller districts are where
conservative strategists focused their efforts in building Congressional power, so taking them
back would be a logical step. It may be possible to generate support in these areas through a
large infrastructure project, such as the recently announced plan the Biden administration wants
to implement that would boost manufacturing to support clean energy initiatives, build out rural
broadband, and construct new transit infrastructure (Tankersley 2021). The plan also calls for
expanded social programs such as free community college, universal pre-k, and national paid
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leave (Tankersley 2021). The tangible benefits of such a proposal are the strategies that will be
most effective in garnering support from smaller districts that have been dominated by
conservative politics in recent memory. The major hurdle is getting the proposal past Congress
with the slight Democratic majority that is still beholden to its own right-wing party members.
The fact is, though, that many of the grievances of American society are rooted in economic
disparity and a lack of government support to fill in the gaps. A more robust welfare state
coupled with government supported industry initiatives would go a long way to preventing
further polarization and reduce the degree of control that corporate managers have over the
workforce.
The American federal system has immense resources at hand and is built to prioritize stability
and resist despotism. We have arrived at the current situation because of decades of sustained
effort to push us here and it is perhaps the greatest threat to the Republic we have seen in
generations. The wealthy will always have power-hungry actors in their ranks and as a class they
will always have political power. Doing away with them would not solve these problems, as
evidenced by the many failures of communism to do just that. What can be done is utilizing the
democratic system for what it, at least in theory, is designed to do: address public grievances
through compromise. Money has corrupted this process and is attempting to eliminate
compromise entirely. Reversing this institutional damage is an enormous task, especially since
said institutions are the only organizations with the power to do so. It will take time and
sustained effort to achieve and still may result in failure. History tells us the alternative would
come at a much greater cost.
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